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Can we quantify over everything: absolutely, positively, de nitely, totally, every thing? Some philosophers have claimed that we must be able to do so, since to claim otherwise is self-contradictory. I want to contest this line of argument.
I start by motivating restrictivism ( §I). I then explain the charge that restrictivism is self-stultifying. e problem is that restrictivists either assert something self-contradictory, or are simply unable to assert their position at all ( §II). One might be inclined to conclude that absolutely unrestricted quanti cation must be possible. But this overlooks the possibility of dadaism. Dadists do not assert any position at all; they are militant quietists, who issue a combative challenge against generalists who seek to quantify 'absolutely unrestrictedly' ( §III). Indeed, dadaists aim to silence everyone who attempts to hold a positive doctrine about 'absolute generality' ( §IV). Whatever its drawbacks may be, dadaism is neither self-contradictory nor self-stultifying: it is a coherent version of restrictivism.
I
Consider the following principle: 1 e Totality Principle. Any true sentence that uses a quanti er must quantify over some totality.
Why is this plausible? Just because, since Tarksi, this has been the standard treatment of quanti ed sentences. Here's another principle: 2 e Extendibility Principle. Given any totality of objects, we can nd some object which is not in that totality.
Why is this plausible? Well, given any totality, T , form the set of all those sets in T which do not contain themselves. By Russell's paradox, this set was not among the original objects in T . I shall not offer any serious defence of these two Principles in this paper. Instead, I want to start by asking whether they can be held simultaneously. is is worth investigating since, together, they yield an interesting argument.
Suppose you produce a sentence, s, that contains quanti ers. By the Totality Principle, there is some totality that s quanti es over. By the Extendibility Principle, we can nd some object which is not in that totality. So there is some object which s did not quantify over. Since s was an arbitrary sentence, we can con dently announce the following challenge: e Challenge. You won't ever manage to produce a sentence that quanti es over everything! Call someone who issues this challenge a restrictivist.
II
Some authors-for example, Lewis (1991 , p. 62), Williamson (2003 and Lavine (2006, p. 102 )-take restrictivists to go beyond issuing this challenge. ey think that restrictivists assert a positive claim, namely:
e Doctrine. For any sentence s, s does not quantify over everything.
And, admittedly, this Doctrine seems to be equally justi ed by the preceding argument from the two Principles. I shall call anyone who accepts this Doctrine a doctrinal restrictivist. Unfortunately-as Lewis, Williamson, Lavine and others have noted-such doctrinal restrictivism is deeply problematic. Since the Doctrine is itself a sentence, we can substitute it into itself, obtaining:
(1) e Doctrine does not quantify over everything.
But since the Doctrine says precisely that no sentence can quantify over everything, we can say that:
(2) e Doctrine quanti es over everything.
And now the doctrinal restrictivist has contradicted herself.
Note that it does not help to argue that the occurrence of 'everything' in the Doctrine is to be read restrictively (that is, as only including some things, rather than absolutely everything). Whichever totality the Doctrine does quantify over-no matter how restrictedly we are to read the word 'everything' in the Doctrine-we ought to read (1) and (2) as quantifying over exactly that totality. Contradiction ensues on all precisi cations of 'everything' , and doctrinal restrictivism seems straightforwardly inconsistent.
In response to the charge of inconsistency, doctrinal restrictivists might argue that the Doctrine's quanti ed expression 'for any sentence s' is self-excepting; that is, that it quanti es over all sentences other than the Doctrine itself. en (1) is not entailed by the Doctrine (at least, not by universal instantiation), and so no contradiction can be derived (at least, not immediately).
For now, let's allow that self-exception is not a cardinal sin. Nonetheless, an obvious problem remains. Even if doctrinal restrictivists don't have to assert (1), they still have to assert (2). But (2) straightforwardly entails:
(3) Some sentence quanti es over everything.
is seems fairly upsetting, by itself, for a doctrinal restrictivist.
To draw the sting, the doctrinal restrictivist should point out that we can instantiate the Doctrine with sentence (3), obtaining:
(4) Sentence (3) does not quantify over everything.
e doctrinal restrictivist can now argue that, when (3) claims that some sentence quanti es over 'everything' , it doesn't say that any sentence quanti es over absolutely everything. On the contrary: (4) shows us that (3) really asserts something restricted. Hence, the doctrinal restrictivist will conclude, (3) need not upset her in the slightest.
e key move in this response is that the Doctrine is only self -excepting. Bearing this in mind, consider a sentence which attempts to express the (selfexcepting) content of the Doctrine in other words:
(5) No sentence (other than the Doctrine) quanti es over everything.
Perhaps, again, we should allow (5) to be self-excepting. However, (5) is distinct from the Doctrine, so we can merrily instantiate the Doctrine with (5), obtaining:
(6) Sentence (5) does not quantify over everything. Now, reasoning as before, (6) shows us that (5) really asserts something restricted. In which case, (5) doesn't express the (self-excepting) content of the Doctrine. Indeed, it doesn't even get close: (6) presumably quanti es over everything that (5) quanti es over, and so witnesses that (5) just says something straightforwardly false.
e apparent upshot of all this is that no sentence other than the Doctrine itself can express the Doctrine's content. In which case, we can't talk about the Doctrine at all. (-'Since any such sentence will quantify restrictedly, relative to the Doctrine?' -No, we cannot even say that!) In such a situation, it is extremely odd to think that the Doctrine expresses anything at all, much less a proposition whose content we could learn or communicate to others. Doctrinal restrictivism may avoid inconsistency, but if it does so, it is utterly selfstultifying.
III
e preceding argument shows that doctrinal restrictivism is either self-contradictory or self-stulti ng. But we cannot conclude from this that generalism is true; that is, we cannot conclude that we can quantify absolutely unrestrictedly. Instead, we ought to reconceive restrictivism. Restrictivism should not be thought of as a positive doctrine, but rather as a form of militant quietism. In this section, I shall explain what this means, by drawing two analogies.
My rst analogy is between restrictivism and Protagorean relativism. (To be clear, though, I don't wish to suggest anything here about the historical Protagoras; I just want to make some suggestions about a position that is Protagorean.) Protagorean relativists sometimes seemed to advocate the doctrine that there are no absolute truths, which prompted critics such as Plato (eaetetus, 170a-171c) to ask:
• Is the doctrine that there are no absolute truths an absolute truth?
I contend that Protagorean relativists should not be embarrassed by this question. e question arises only if we treat Protagorean relativism as the positive doctrine that there are no absolute truths. It should instead be treated as a challenge to the absolutist: Give me something which you think is an absolute truth; engage with me in conversation for a while; and by the time you leave, I will have convinced you that your putative 'absolute truth' is-by your own lights-thoroughly relative. You defeat this Protagorean relativist not by showing that some positive doctrine is self-stultifying, but by showing why some speci c sentence is absolutely true aer all.
4
I do not wish to defend Protagorean relativism here; I simply want to employ the Protagorean's defensive strategy. Restrictivists sometimes seem to advocate a Doctrine, which prompts critics to ask:
• Does the Doctrine that nothing quanti es absolutely generally quantify absolutely generally?
is question is problematic if and only if restrictivism is treated as a positive doctrine. To be sure, any positive doctrine of restrictivism is self-stultifying:
that's what the question shows, for it leads directly to the problems discussed in §II. But the restrictivist should not be embarrassed by this. Restrictivists should simply issue a Challenge to their opponents (as originally suggested in §I) without ever falling into the trap of drawing a positive conclusion about 'absolute generality' (such as the Doctrine). e restrictivist should simply pick a ght: Give me a sentence which you think quanti es over absolutely everything; engage with me in conversation for a while; and by the time you leave, I will have convinced you that you failed-by your own lights-to quantify over absolutely everything. You defeat this restrictivist not by showing that some positive doctrine is self-stultifying, but by showing why some speci c sentence quanti es over absolutely everything aer all.
5
Bearing this in mind, it is worth asking what role (if any) the Doctrine has to play in restrictivism. To answer this question, it will help to draw a second analogy; this time, with Feyerabendian irrationalism.
6
Feyerabend once wrote, with his tongue rmly in his cheek, that 'there is only one principle that can be defended under all circumstances and in all stages of human development. It is the principle: anything goes ' (1975, p. 28) . is seemed to amount to the advocation of some principle, which prompted critics such as Putnam (1981, pp. 113-26) to ask, in effect:
• Does 'anything go' with regard to the principle anything goes? is barbed question was not one that Feyerabend felt he needed to address, since (he claimed) it misunderstood his stance:
I… occasionally wrote in a rather ironical vein…. 'anything goes' is not a 'principle' I hold… but the terri ed exclamation of a rationalist who takes a closer look at history (1993, p. vii).
Again, my aim is not to defend Feyerabendian irrationalism; I simply want to employ Feyerabend's explanatory strategy. e restrictivist should explain the role of the Doctrine as follows:
I occasionally spoke in a rather ironical vein. e Doctrine is not a 'principle' I hold, but the terri ed exclamation of a generalist who takes a closer look at the Two Principles.
In short, Protagoreans on 'absolute truth' , Feyerabendians on 'rationality' , and now restrictivists on 'absolute generality' , should all be seen as simply challenging their opponents. If they ever seem to go beyond this challenge, they ought to do so only in 'a rather ironical vein' . In homage to Feyerabend (1975, p. 21, 33) , I shall call such 'ironical' restrictivists dadaists. (ose restrictivists who foolishly adhere to their Doctrine without irony will retain the name doctrinal restrictivists.)
To be clear, then: the dadaist never (sincerely) does anything more than challenge her generalist opponents to one-on-one arguments. Generalists will be 'apt to call this an argumentum ad hominem' , but what of it? Argumentum ad hominem is the right method of argumentation here. Dadaists-like relativists and irrationalists-are 'addressing humans, not… dogs' (Feyerabend 1975, pp. 113-4) .
IV
We have seen the rough shape that dadaism will have to take: it must content itself with issuing challenges, and refrain from drawing positive conclusions.
5 When I presented this paper at the 2009 Joint Session, other helpful analogies were suggested to me by Daniel Hill, Brian King and Richard Pettigrew. ese included: (i) Apophaticists, who 'think' that we cannot speak about God; (ii) Kantians, who 'think' that we cannot speak about noumena; and (iii) Pyrrhonians, who 'think' that we cannot know anything. In all three cases, one might distinguish a doctrine from a challenge (hence the scare-quotes around 'think'). Space does not permit it here, but I hope to be able to explore these (and other) connections elsewhere.
6 Feyerabend (1993, pp. 226, 268-9) connects his own irrationalism with Protagorean relativism.
We should now explore dadaism in a little more detail. To do so, it will help to consider two objections that a generalist might raise against dadaism. Neither objection is successful, but responding to them helps to illustrate just how deep dadaism goes.
First Objection. e dadaist was led to issue her Challenge by invoking the two Principles. But these Principles themselves require absolutely unrestricted quanti cation. For example: the Extendibility Principle quanti es universally over all totalities, and it had better quantify over absolutely all of them if her Challenge is to have any bite. But that is surely just to quantify over everything (albeit, partioned up among the totalities). So the dadaist herself depends upon absolutely unrestricted quanti cation.
is objection certainly poses a problem for the doctrinal restrictivist. Aer all, the doctrinal restrictivist wants to assert the Doctrine on the basis of the truth of the two Principles. So this objection supplements the arguments of §II, by showing once again that doctrinal restrictivism is self-stultifying. However, this objection raises no problems for the dadaist. e dadaist need not assert the Extendibility Principle, nor the Totality Principle, 'with absolute generality' (so to speak). For the purposes of her Challenge, all she needs to do is to convince you, the generalist, that the sentence s, which you thought quanti ed over 'absolutely everything' , actually does not. She only needs to convince you that there is some object that s fails to quantify over, for the particular s that you gave her. So the dadaist is free to reply to the First Objection as follows:
First Reply. I do not speak of the two Principles because I believe in them. Using a reductio ad absurdum does not commit the arguer to accepting the premises. 7 However, this reply is very slightly imprecise, and its imprecision is likely to provoke a rather more interesting objection from the generalist: Second Objection. e dadaist just admitted that she uses the two Principles in a reductio ad absurdum. In this, she is surely right: the Doctrine leads to a straightforward logical contradiction, in the form of sentences (1) and (2). In that case, we can classically derive the Doctrine's negation, namely, sentence (3). But the dadaist surely does not want to assert (3)! is objection again misunderstands dadaism. In fact, the dadaist can allow anyone who wants to to assert (3), for the dadaist maintains that (3) can bring joy to the generalist. But this requires some explanation.
Suppose the generalist asserts (3), and understands it according to the Totality Principle. en all he has succeeded in saying, by his own lights, is that some sentence quanti es over everything-that-(3)-quanti es-over. is is perfectly true; aer all, on this understanding of (3), sentence (3) is itself a perfectly good witness to its own truth. But equally, on this understanding, sentence (3) clearly does not express the generalist's thesis. It expresses little more than the innocuous claim: sometimes I use the universal quanti er
What's more, the dadaist thinks that she can convince the generalist that sentence (3) cannot mean what the generalist wants it to mean. Let's grant, for now, that the dadaist is very good at arguing with her opponents (I shall come back to this assumption in §V). at is, whenever the dadaist meets someone who calls himself a generalist, and who says 'I can quantify absolutely unrestrictedly' , our dadaist can show the generalist that those words do not mean what the generalist wanted them to mean. To be able to do this, the dadaist does not need to claim to understand what the generalist wants those words to mean. All the dadaist needs to know is that her generalist interlocutor has become upset during the course of conversation. e dadaist can determine this fact on behavioural grounds alone (by the generalist's weeping, gnashing of teeth, etc.).
If this happens oen enough, the dadaist is likely to conclude that any attempt to state a positive doctrine of generalism inevitably fails in its ambitions. Of course, our dadaist thinks that any positive doctrine of restrictivism fails too: she paid attention during §II of this paper, and thoroughly endorses the conclusion that doctrinal restrictivism is self-stultifying. Our dadaist therefore thinks that any putative positive doctrine whatsoever about 'unrestricted quanti cation' fails in its ambitions, whether that doctrine is generalist or restrictivist.
Putting all this together, then, the dadaist ought to clarify her imprecise First Reply with a second, more careful, speech:
Second Reply. When I argue with my opponents, I do not speak of 'absolute generality' because I believe in it or pretend to know what it means. On the contrary, I want to show that talking about 'absolute generality' is nonsense.
Strictly speaking, then, this is not to engage in a reductio ad absurdum. To engage in a reductio, I would have to start by assuming that some sentence is true, and proceed to derive its negation. In fact, I start by pretending that some sentence makes sense (some sentence containing the phrase 'absolute generality' or 'absolutely everything'), and I then produce a series of sounds which might seem, to my opponent, like a logical argument leading towards a contradiction. Now, when I do this, I do not think that I am giving a logical argument. On the contrary, many of the sentences that I utter along the way are sheer nonsense, and I am well aware that putting logical connectives between nonsense yields not a logical argument, but just more complicated nonsense.
My opponents, by contrast, believe that 'absolute generality' makes sense. And, so long as they believe this, they are compelled to treat the sounds I make as constituting an argument (in the most straightforward sense). In so doing-and I know this from past experience-my opponents become completely tangled up in knotty paradoxes, and they can't explain themselves. Sometimes, this feeling of aporia helps them to see that what they had been trying to say was nonsensical garbage; other times, they simply can't be helped out of their muddle. But, however they react, the Second Objection does not affect me at all. e reason for this is straightforward: pretending that some phrase makes sense-in order to show that it does not-does not commit me to accepting that the phrase does make sense. 8 By their own admission, then, dadaists (sometimes) spout nonsense. But, unlike the nonsense of doctrinal restrictivism, it is not self -stultifying nonsense. Rather, it is nonsense that stulti es every putative positive doctrine about 'absolute generality' . Since the dadaist holds no such doctrine, she has nothing to fear from her own nonsense.
V
It should now be clear why dadaism amounts to militant quietism. Dadaists seek to force everyone into silence on the matter of 'absolutely unrestricted' quantication. Such a quietist position is surely coherent, and that is all I have attempted to show in this short paper.
For all that, dadaism might well be wrong. Everything depends on whether dadaists are any good at arguing with their opponents. Dadaism ounders if and only if someone can answer the dadaist Challenge of §I on its own terms. You must try to produce a sentence which seems like it quanti es over everything. e dadaist will run an argument to show you why your sentence does not do what you wanted it to do (whatever that may have been). If you can block the dadaist's argument, then victory is yours. But there is no quick proof of generalism from the failure of doctrinal restrictivism, for dadaism is a coherent version of-or, perhaps better, heir to-restrictivism. 
